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Third-Party Defenses to Mortgages
Ann M. Burkhart'
I. INTRODUCTION
When the holder of a note and mortgage' asserts its rights,
well-established law delineates what defenses are available to
those who are liable for the debt. However, in some cases a per-
son who is not liable for the debt-a "third party" to the loan
transaction-may have a defense against the holder's action.
Although the third party is not liable for the debt, it may have
an interest in the mortgaged land or in the mortgage itself. Un-
fortunately, the law is not nearly as clear in this situation. The
confusion arises in large part because the laws concerning notes
and mortgages have evolved with little regard for each other,
despite their close association in commercial transactions.
To resolve the conflict between the two bodies of law, courts
state that, because the mortgage is a mere ancillary of the note,
it should be governed by the same law as the note-Article 3 of
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) or the common law of
contracts. This reliance on commercial law is completely mis-
placed when deciding issues concerning title to land or to a
mortgage and leads to untoward results. Although commercial
law defines which defenses are available to a person liable on
the note, titles to land and to mortgages are governed by the
land laws and by the recording acts in particular. Pursuant to
those laws, a third party's claim to land or to a mortgage is gov-
erned by one criterion-notice. That one factor is the correct
basis for decision in all the third-party defense cases.
* Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. With special thanks
to Professors Grant S. Nelson and William D. Warren for their valuable comments on
a draft of this article and to Emily E. Flynn, Deidre D. McGrath, and Thayer H.
Thompson for their able research assistance.
1. For ease of reference, the term "mortgage" will be used throughout this Article
to refer generically to all forms of real estate security. Although the various types of
real estate security and the documents by which they are created differ, those
differences are irrelevant to the discussion in this Article, except where noted otherwise.
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II. CATEGORIES OF THIRD-PARTY DEFENSE CASES
Another source of confusion in these cases is the morass of
facts involved in each case. Because the cases almost always
involve fraud or other wrongful conduct, the facts are often quite
complicated. Wrongdoers often act through a series of nominees,
designees, straw people, and shell corporations; engage in con-
duct that wrongfully enables them to collect payments on loans
they no longer own or to sell the same loan more than once; and
otherwise act to obfuscate and cover their tracks. However, or-
der does exist within this chaos of facts. Distilled to their essen-
tials, the third-party defense cases virtually all involve one of
the following six fact patterns:2
2. A seventh category of case exists, but it is so different from the other
categories as to be inapposite. This category involves cases in which a third party, such
as a junior lienor, asserts the borrower's defenses against enforcement of the mortgage.
The defenses include failure of consideration, fraud in the inducement, expiration of the
statute of limitations, the one-action rule, unconscionability, and usury. Although third
parties have asserted these defenses against enforcement of a mortgage in a substantial
number of cases, the great bulk of these cases involve the original mortgagee so that
notice is not an issue as it is in the other six categories. Moreover, these defenses do
not address ownership of a mortgage or of the mortgaged land. Instead, they usually
are asserted to prevent elimination of that ownership interest by foreclosure or
execution of a senior lien. Therefore, these cases will not be considered in the text of
this Article. However, because they are defenses asserted by third parties, they will be
examined briefly in this footnote.
A purchaser of property subject to a mortgage generally is barred from asserting
any defense of the original borrower when the purchase price for the land was reduced
to reflect the secured debt. See GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE
FINANCE LAw § 5.17 (3d ed. 1994). Additionally, third parties usually cannot assert
these defenses against a holder in due course because they normally are characterized
as personal defenses. See infra notes 10-11 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., FDIC
v. Wood, 758 F.2d 156 (6th Cir. 1985) (usury); City Lumber Co. v. Park, 58 P.2d 403
(Cal. Ct. App. 1936) (failure of consideration); Wilson Bros. v. Cooey, 247 A.2d 395 (Md.
1968) (failure of consideration); Katz v. Simcha Co., 246 A.2d 555 (Md. 1968) (usury).
On the other hand, when a nonholder in due course holds the note and mortgage, a
third party generally can assert the following defenses: (1) expiration of the statute of
limitations, see, e.g., Billingsley v. Pruitt, 291 S.W.2d 498 (Ark. 1956); Flack v. Boland,
77 P.2d 1090 (Cal. 1938); Kaichen's Metal Mart, Inc. v. Ferro Cast Co., 39 Cal. Rptr.
2d 233 (Ct. App. 1995); O'Neil v. General Security Corp., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 712 (Ct. App.
1992); (2) fraud in the inducement, see, e.g., Kirk v. MacDonald, 483 N.E.2d 832 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1985); (3) payment of the debt, see, e.g., Woods v. Bournes, 309 S.W.2d 309
(Ark. 1958); Hart v. Louis S. Levi Co., 22 N.E.2d 30 (Mass. 1939); (4) the foreclosing
party does not own the mortgage, see, e.g., V.S. Cook Lumber Co. v. Harris, 71 P.2d 446
(Okla. 1937); and (5) the one-action rule, see, e.g., O'Neil v. General Sec. Corp., 5 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 712 (Ct. App. 1992).
Some courts have characterized other defenses as being personal to the borrower
and, therefore, unavailable to third parties, including unconscionability, see, e.g., County
of Tioga v. Solid Waste Indus., 577 N.Y.S.2d 922 (App. Div. 1991), and failure of
10031 THIRD PARTY DEFENSES TO MORTGAGES 1005
A. Fraud
DWd MortgageOwner (Third Party) -7 Grantee - > Mortgagee
In a typical fraud case, a landowner is fraudulently induced
to convey title to a grantee who then gives a mortgage on the
land to secure a debt. If a court voids the deed because of the
fraudulent conduct and the former owner thereby reacquires
title, is the title still encumbered by the mortgage or can the
former owner successfully assert the fraud to eliminate the
mortgage?
consideration, see, e.g., 527-9 Lenox Ave. Realty Corp. v. Ninth St. Ass'n, 606 N.Y.S.2d
699 (App. Div. 1994); County of Tioga v. Solid Waste Indus., 577 N.Y.S.2d 922 (App.
Div. 1991). But see Hart v. Louis S. Levi Co., 22 N.E.2d 30 (Mass. 1939); In re Levine,
23 B.R. 410 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982). The defense that has caused the greatest division
of authority is usury. The majority of cases, including most of the more recent cases,
characterize the defense as being a personal defense of the borrower that is unavailable
to junior lienors. See, e.g., Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Griffin, 935 F.2d 691 (5th
Cir. 1991); United States v. Desert Gold Mining Co., 433 F.2d 713 (9th Cir. 1970);
Maestro Music, Inc. v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 354 P.2d 266 (Ariz. 1960); Sosin v.
Richardson, 26 Cal. Rptr. 610 (Ct. App. 1962); Commonwealth Trailer Sales v. Bradt,
87 N.W.2d 705 (Neb. 1958); Tanner v. Mobley, 354 S.W.2d 446 (Tenn. 1962); Allee v.
Benser, 779 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. 1988). Other courts, however, permit junior lienors to
assert the defense of usury, particularly when the junior wants to exercise its equity
of redemption with respect to the senior mortgage. See, e.g., National Sur. Corp. v.
Inland Properties, Inc, 286 F. Supp. 173 (E.D. Ark. 1968); In re Langer, 6 F. Supp. 651
(E.D.N.Y. 1934); Fikes v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 533 P.2d 251 (Alaska 1975);
Cole v. Bansemer, 26 Ind. 94 (1866); Broadhurst v. Brooks, 113 S.E. 576 (N.C. 1922).
In at least two states, usury is classified as a real defense that is available even
against a holder in due course. See, e.g., Andrews v. Martin, 436 S.W.2d 285 (Ark.
1969); Lucas v. Beco Homes, Inc., 494 S.W.2d 417 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
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B. Resulting Trust
Legal 1 Trustee Mortga Mortgagee
Title
Owner <
Equitable Beneficiary
Title (Third Party)
A resulting trust is created when a landowner conveys title
to a trustee but does not designate the trustee's status on the
deed so that the deed appears to be an outright conveyance of
fee title. Despite the failure to express the trustee's status on the
deed, the trustee holds the property in trust for the beneficiary.
If the trustee violates the trust by mortgaging the land to secure
a personal loan, can the beneficiary successfully assert the exis-
tence of the resulting trust to eliminate the mortgage?
C. Wrongful Release by the Original Mortgagee
Mo Assignment
Owner -M ortgagee >-Assignee
Release (Unrecorded)
Deed!
Mortgage
y
Buyer/Mortgagee
(Third Party)
When an assignee fails to record a mortgage assignment, the
original mortgagee still appears from the property records to
own the mortgage. If the landowner sells the land after the as-
signment and uses the sale proceeds to pay the debt to the origi-
nal mortgagee in exchange for its execution of a mortgage re-
lease, is the buyer's title subject to the mortgage? Similarly, if
the landowner borrows money to pay the mortgage debt and
gives a mortgage to secure the new loan, is the new mortgage
subject to the prior mortgage or is the prior mortgage elimi-
nated?
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D. Wrongful Release by a Mortgagee that Acquired Fee Title
(1) Owner Mortgage A Mortgagee ,Assignment •Assignee
Deed (Unrecorded)
(2) Owner Deed> Mortgagee
(3) Mortgagee e Buyer (Third Party)
This category of cases is similar to the third category but
differs in legally significant ways. As in the last category, the
original mortgagee purports to release a mortgage after having
assigned it to someone else. Unlike the last category, however,
the original mortgagee has acquired title to the encumbered
land after assigning the mortgage. Because the mortgage as-
signment is unrecorded, the original mortgagee appears to own
both the mortgage and the fee title to the encumbered land.
Therefore, this category of cases implicates the doctrine of
merger, which potentially applies when a person owns more
than one interest in a parcel of land. In contrast, the cases in the
third category involve a written release. As in the preceding
category, the issue in these cases is whether the buyer is subject
to the mortgage or can use the wrongful release as a defense
against it.
E. Mortgage as a Fraud on Creditors
OnrMoitgage, 
____Mort___Assgne
Owner Mortgagee Assignment * Assignee(Third Party)
This type of case typically arises when a landowner attempts
to shelter its land from creditors by granting a mortgage in favor
of an ally for little or no consideration. After the mortgage is
assigned, can it still be invalidated as a fraudulent conveyance?
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F. Mortgage Assigned Twice
Assignee #1
1 (Third Party)
Assignment,-
Owner Mortgage> Mortgagee
Assignment 4
Assignee #l2
(Third Party)
If the original mortgagee assigns the same mortgage twice,
which assignee owns it? If one assignee brings an action to fore-
close the mortgage, can the other assert its claimed ownership of
the mortgage as a defense?
III. APPROACHES FROM COMMERCIAL LAW: THE COMMON LAW OF
CONTRACTS AND UCC ARTICLE 3
Courts and commentators often state that the answers to the
questions presented by these cases are governed by one of two
bodies of law-the common law of contracts or Article 3 of the
UCC Article 3 applies if the note is a "negotiable instrument" as
defined by the Code. The common law applies otherwise. As
described below, the common law and Article 3 employ very
different approaches to the availability of defenses.
A. Common Law of Contracts
Under the common law of contracts, defenses to the note and
mortgage are divided into "patent equities" and "latent equi-
ties."3 This division is based on whose defense it is to assert. The
borrower's defenses are called patent equities because they are
discoverable by the exercise of reasonable diligence. An assignee
of the note and mortgage knows the borrower's identity; after
all, this is the person from whom it expects to receive loan pay-
ments. Therefore, the theory is that the assignee simply can ask
the borrower whether it has any defenses to enforcement of the
note or mortgage.
3. See NELSON & WHrMlAN, supra note 2, § 5.32.
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Unfortunately, as happens too often in this hoary area of
law, practice has diverged from theory.4 The number of out-
standing mortgage loans has increased exponentially since the
era during which the patent/latent distinction was drawn. Loans
from around the country are sold and resold in pools of hundreds
or thousands on the secondary mortgage market. Rather than
ask each borrower whose loan is in the pool whether it has any
defenses, secondary market purchasers typically rely on the
seller's representations and warranties that no defenses exist.
Despite this transformation of the mortgage market, which
makes questioning each borrower impracticable, the common
law of contracts subjects mortgage assignees to patent equities.
In contrast to patent equities, latent equities are third-party
defenses. They are latent because they are generally undiscover-
able by the exercise of ordinary diligence. The prospective mort-
gage assignee normally will not know the third party's identity
because, by definition, the third party was not involved in the
loan transaction. Therefore, the assignee cannot inquire of the
third party whether it has any defenses.
Courts deciding cases involving latent equities appear to
reach dramatically different results. In some cases, courts hold
that a mortgage assignee is subject to latent equities because
the original mortgagee is subject to them; the original mort-
gagee can convey no greater rights to enforce the mortgage than
it had.5 In other cases, courts categorically state that assignees
are not subject to latent equities because of the difficulties that
otherwise would be created for purchasers of loans.6 As will be
described below, however, a single factor-notice-unifies and
harmonizes virtually every one of these cases.
B. Article 3 of the UCC
If the note conforms with the requirements of Article 3 of the
UCC, it is a "negotiable instrument"7 and is governed by the
4. See, e.g., Dale A. Whitman, Reforming the Law: The Payment Rule as
Paradigm, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1169.
5. See, e.g., In re Levine, 23 B.R. 410 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); Owen v. Evans,
31 N.E. 999, 1000-01 (N.Y. 1892); Trustees of Union College v. Wheeler, 16 Sickels 12
(N.Y. 1874).
6. See, e.g., Bloomer v. Henderson, 8 Mich. 395 (1860); Simpson v. Del Hoyo, 94
N.Y. 189 (1883).
7. See U.C.C. § 3-104 (1995) (specifying the requirements for a negotiable
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provisions of the Code, rather than by the common law of con-
tracts.8 With respect to defenses to enforcement of a negotiable
instrument, Article 3 distinguishes between an instrument held
by a holder in due course (HDC) and an instrument held by
someone who is not a holder in due course (non-HDC). A non-
HDC is subject to all the defenses that can be asserted under the
common law of contracts.9 Therefore, in a case involving a non-
HDC, a court will apply the common law distinction between
patent and latent equities.
In contrast, an HDC is insulated from many defenses. Un-
like the common law, which categorizes defenses as patent or
latent equities, Article 3 categorizes defenses as real or per-
sonal.10 Whereas the common law's distinction is based on whose
defense it is to assert, Article 3's distinction is based on the type
of defense. The most serious defenses-those that go to the very
heart of the transaction's validity-are real defenses, such as
duress, lack of legal capacity, and illegality. The less serious
defenses, such as failure of consideration, are personal defenses.
An HDC is subject only to real defenses. It can enforce the nego-
tiable instrument without being subject to personal defenses."
This special protection for HDCs is designed to facilitate the
flow of capital throughout the country by insulating secondary
loan market purchasers from most defenses. 2
In categorizing defenses based on their substance, rather
than on the person asserting them, Article 3 overlooked third-
party defenses. Although predecessor legislation appeared to
apply to both obligors' and third parties' defenses, Article 3's
provisions concerning real and personal defenses refer only to
instrument).
8. See id. § 3-102(a).
9. See id. § 3-305(a)-(b).
10. See 2 THOMAS D. CRANDALL ET AL., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 16.13.2
(1996).
11. See U.C.C. § 3-305(b) (1995). The D'Oench, Duhme doctrine provides
equivalent protection to the FDIC and RTC. The United States Supreme Court created
this federal common law doctrine in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447
(1942). See also Resolution Trust Corp. v. Maplewood Invs., 31 F.3d 1276, 1290-94 (4th
Cir. 1994); Milligan v. Gilmore Meyer, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 400, 403-05 (S.D. Ga. 1991);
Barbara A. Bailey, Giving D'Oench its Due: A Comment on the D'Oench, Duhme Doctrine
After O'Melveny & Meyers v. FDIC, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1259 (1996); J. Michael Echevarria,
A Precedent Embalms a Principle: The Expansion of the D'Oench, Duhme Doctrine, 43
CATH. U. L. REV. 745 (1994).
12. See 2 JAMEs J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMIMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 150
(4th ed. 1995).
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defenses "of the obligor"; no other provision addresses third-
party defenses.13
Article 3's legislative history sheds no light on this issue.
The available legislative histories for both the 1952 and 1990
versions of Article 3 are silent on the issue of third-party de-
fenses. Although an early draft of Article 3 provided that an
HDC takes free of "all defenses" other than a few enumerated
types of defenses, the Reporter's Note does not indicate that the
drafters considered the issue of third-party defenses. 4 The Re-
porter's Note for this section contains the only reference to mort-
gages. It states that one subsection of this provision "is intended
to meet the problem of the note and mortgage." 5 However, the
drafters' concern appears to have been whether the purchaser of
a note can be an HDC despite knowledge that a mortgage "pur-
ports to affect the note," rather than with the issue of third-
party defenses. 16
The apparent absence of any mention of third-party defenses
may be attributable at least in part to the dearth of legislative
13. Section 58 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (N.I.L.), which was the
immediate predecessor of Article 3, provided that a non-HDC of a negotiable instrument
"is subject to the same defenses as if it were nonnegotiable." 5 U.LA. § 58 (1996). This
provision was not limited expressly to defenses of the obligor but apparently included
third-party defenses as well. See James J. Morrison, Equities of Ownership and Equities
of Defence in Overdue Paper, 5 TUL. L. REv. 287, 297-301 (1931). But see Meriwether
v. New Orleans Real Estate Bd., 162 So. 208, 210-11 (La. 1935). In contrast, section 57
of the N.I.L. provided that an HDC held the instrument "free from defenses available
to prior parties among themselves." 5 U.LA. § 57 (1996). This provision does not
include third-party defenses.
When Article 3 was promulgated in 1952 to replace the N.I.L., the more expansive
language of section 58 was replaced with language that did not include third-party
defenses. Both section 3-305(2), which dealt with HDCs, and section 3-306(b), which
dealt with non-HDCs, provided only for "defenses of any party." The Code's definition
of "party" expressly excluded third parties, see U.C.C. § 1-201(29) (1952), even though
the Official Comment to section 3-306 states that section 3-306(b) merely "restates the
first sentence of the original [slection 58." U.C.C. § 3-306 (1997) Official Comment.
The original version of Article 3 was completely revised by the version promulgated
in 1990. The 1990 Official Edition provisions concerning HDCs and non-EDCs again
addressed only defenses "of the obligor." U.C.C. § 3-305(a), (b) (1997). Third-party
defenses are not mentioned.
14. See U.C.C. Art. I1, Third Preliminary Draft § 47 (Feb. 9-12, 1946), reprinted
in 2 E.S. KELLY & A. PUCKErr, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: CONFIDENTIAL DRAFTS 93,
154 (1995) [hereinafter CONFMENTIAL DRAFrS]. Tentative Draft No. 3, dated August 20,
1947, changed this language. It provided that HDCs took free from "all defenses of any
party" with the exception of certain enumerated defenses. Reprinted in 3 E.S. KELLY,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTs 357 (1984).
15. 2 CONFIDENTIAL DRAFLS, supra note 14, at 349.
16. See id. at 349-50.
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history and of publicly available materials in particular.17 But
the larger problem-if not the entire problem-is that the UCC
and the common law of mortgages have remained largely sepa-
rate bodies of law despite their close association in commercial
transactions. While mortgage law readily traces its lineage to
twelfth-century England, Article 3 and its predecessor, the Ne-
gotiable Instruments Law (N.I.L.), have thoroughly modernized
and codified the laws affecting negotiable instruments. With
respect to security for the debt evidenced by the instrument,
Article 3 was drafted to intermesh with Article 9 of the UCC,
which deals with security interests in personal property. How-
ever, Article 3 appears to have been drafted without reference to
mortgage law or to land law more generally. In fact, the Code's
definition of "security interest"-"an interest in personal prop-
erty or fixtures"'S-clearly reveals the Code's disregard of real
estate and mortgages.
lIV. MAKING THE LINK: NOTICE
Because negotiable instruments and mortgages are so fre-
quently linked in practice, courts have had to find a way to har-
monize the laws governing them. To bridge the gap between
them, courts in all but one state hold that a negotiable instru-
ment imparts its quality of negotiability to the mortgage.' 9
Courts reason that because the mortgage is an incident of and
dependent on the debt, it should be enforceable to the same
extent as the debt.2° As a result, courts state that the mortgage
17. Legislative history for the UCC is scarce. Materials such as unpublished
proceedings, minutes, and debates concerning the drafting of the UCC are essentially
unavailable. See SPECIALIZED LEGAL RESEARCH § 2.4,1., at 2-32 (Leah F. Chanin ed.,
1997). Therefore, the primary sources for interpreting the drafters' intent comes from
the texts of the Official Editions and the preliminary drafts and from the Official
Comments included after each provision in the text. Locating even these sources can
be difficult, because some of the drafts are confidential or otherwise unpublished. See
id. § 2.4.1, at 2-31 & n.7, § 2.4.4., at 2-39 to 2-41.
18. U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1997).
19. See NELSON & WHIMAN, supra note 2, § 5.31 n.13 and accompanying text.
Minnesota is the lone holdout. See Lundberg v. Northwestern Natl Bank, 216 N.W.2d
121 (Minn. 1974); Johnson v. Howe, 223 N.W. 148 (Minn. 1929). In a few states in
which courts adhered to the minority position, the state legislature acted to adopt the
majority rule. See, e.g., LA. CIrV. CODE ANN. art. 3296 (West 1994) (Revision Comments-
1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1309.17 (West 1998) (Legislative Service Comm'n).
20. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Longan, 33 U.S. 271, 275 (1872); Anchor Loan Co. v.
Willett, 137 N.E.2d 532, 535 (Ohio 1956); First Nat'l Bank v. Brotherton, 84 N.E. 794,
797 (Ohio 1908); Ashland Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Kerman, 155 N.E. 245, 246 (Ohio Ct.
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is subject only to those defenses available against the note. If
the note is held by an HDC, the mortgage-like the note-is
insulated from personal defenses. Some of the courts protecting
mortgages in this way express an intent to facilitate the second-
ary mortgage market by protecting its purchasers from defenses
to the mortgages.2'
Extending the note's protections to the mortgage is analyti-
cally and practically sound when dealing with a person who is
liable on the note. If the mortgagee could sue on the note free of
a personal defense but was barred from enforcing the mortgage
because of it, the mortgagee usually could circumvent this rule
by getting a judgment on the note and then executing the judg-
ment against the mortgaged land.22 Therefore, to avoid creating
both a multiplicity of actions and an unseemly method for ac-
complishing indirectly that which cannot be accomplished di-
rectly, it is best to allow the mortgagee to enforce the mortgage
free of defenses whenever it can enforce the note.
However, the same considerations do not apply with respect
to a third party's defenses. First, Article 3 does not expressly cut
off a third party's defenses; it expressly addresses only the obli-
gor's defenses. Section 3-305(b) provides that an HDC's right to
enforce an instrument "is subject to [real] defenses of the
obligor... but is not subject to [personal] defenses of the obli-
gor."' An argument that this language subjects an HDC only to
the obligor's real defenses but, by negative implication, not to a
third party's defenses is exceedingly weak. The absence of any
reference to third-party defenses in Article 3 or in its legislative
history strongly supports the conclusion that Article 3's drafters
simply did not consider the situation in which a third party has
a claim to the mortgaged land or to the mortgage. This omission
App. 1926); Van Burkleo v. Southwestern Mfg. Co., 39 S.W. 1085, 1088 (Tex. App.
1896).
21. See, e.g., Carnegie Bank v. Shalleck, 606 A.2d 389, 400 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1992).
22. See Carpenter, 83 U.S. at 274. In some situations, however, the mortgagee
would be unable to execute a judgment against the land even if it could have foreclosed
its mortgage but for the personal defense. For example, in some states, homestead
legislation permits the foreclosure of certain mortgages against a homestead but will
not permit a judgment creditor to execute its lien against the land. See 2 RICHARD R.
POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 18.03(5) (1997).
23. U.C.C. § 3-305(b) (1997).
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is unsurprising because Article 3 is concerned with actions on
the note and not with actions on the mortgage.
Second, the types of defenses that the Code classifies as real
or personal reflect a failure to consider claims to mortgages or to
mortgaged land. The real and personal defenses deal with situa-
tions such as the obligor's lack of capacity and fraud that was
exercised upon the obligor. These types of defenses are qualita-
tively different than the defenses that arise concerning title to
the mortgage and to the mortgaged land, such as resulting
trusts and merger.
However, the most important reason that Article 3 should
not be interpreted to cut off third-party defenses is the funda-
mental unfairness of eliminating an owner's title to a mortgage
or to mortgaged land based on a loan transaction to which it was
not a party. Absent a clear expression of legislative intent, this
outcome should not be considered a possibility. However, courts
have stated in a variety of cases that a mortgage is subject only
to real defenses and not to personal defenses when held by an
HDC.24
An examination of these cases reveals, however, that al-
though courts frame the issue as involving a real or personal
defense, the case actually is decided on a different ground-the
presence or absence of notice of a conflicting interest.
A. Notice as the Key Element
By focusing on notice, the results in the Article 3 cases mir-
ror the common law cases in which courts apply the patent and
latent equity distinction. In both the Article 3 cases and the
common law cases, notice or the absence of notice dictates the
result of the case even when a court states the issue as involving
a real or personal defense, or a patent or latent equity. Notice
preserves the defense; absence of notice destroys it.
The following discussion of the six categories of third-party
defense cases demonstrates that notice is the key factor. The
24. See, e.g., Milligan v. Gilmore Meyer Inc., 775 F. Supp. 400 (S.D. Ga. 1991);
Gribble v. Mauerhan, 10 Cal. Rptr. 296 (Ct. App. 1961); City Lumber Co. v. Park, 58
P.2d 403 (Cal. Ct. App. 1936); Hayward Lumber & Inv. Co. v. Naslund, 13 P.2d 775
(Cal. Ct. App. 1932); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Berman Indus., 637 A.2d 1297, 1299
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993); Carnegie Bank v. Shalleck, 606 A.2d 389 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1992); Willett, 137 N.E.2d at 535; North W. Mortgage Inv. Corp. v.
Slumkoski, 478 P.2d 748 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970).
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necessary notice can be actual or constructive, such as that pro-
vided by the public land records. In fact, courts often cite their
concern for the integrity of the land records as a reason for pro-
tecting both the person who examined the records and found no
conflicting claim and the person who recorded evidence of its
claim.25 By protecting those who rely on the records and by re-
warding those who record evidence of their interests, the courts
are pursuing a policy of making the land records as complete
and reliable as possible. In some cases, the pursuit of this policy
injures an otherwise blameless person, but that outcome is not
uncommon when a particular community good is viewed as be-
ing more important than protecting any given individual.
1. Fraud
In virtually every case involving a deed, mortgage, or mort-
gage assignment obtained by fraud, courts have held that the
fraud could not be asserted against a mortgage assignee that did
not have notice of it.26 The result is the same whether the se-
cured note is negotiable or nonnegotiable and whether the
holder is an HDC or non-HDC. Courts routinely give two rea-
sons for this result. First, as between the person who was de-
frauded and the innocent assignee, the former is more culpable
because it was a participant, albeit unwittingly, in the fraud. As
the less culpable party, the assignee is protected. Second, courts
stress their concern for the reliability of the recording system.
Because the fraud could not be discovered from an examination
of the property records, an innocent assignee takes title to the
mortgage free of the defense.
Courts adhere to this rule even when facing very hard facts,
as vividly illustrated by Bell v. Canal Bank & Trust Co.27 In Bell,
Manuel Bell and his brother, Pleasant, owned forty arpents of
25. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 271 (1872); Gregory v. Savage, 32
Conn. 250, 261 (1864); Jenks v. Shaw, 68 N.W. 900, 904 (Iowa 1896); Bell v. Canal
Bank & Trust Co., 190 So. 359, 364 (La. 1939); Ames v. Miller, 91 N.W. 250 (Neb.
1902); Landis v. Robacker, 169 A. 891 (Pa. 1933).
26. See, e.g., Humble v. Curtis, 43 N.E. 749 (Ill. 1895); Robertson v. United States
Live Stock Co., 145 N.W. 535 (Iowa 1914); Bell v. Canal Bank & Trust Co., 190 So. 359
(La. 1939); Bloomer v. Henderson, 8 Mich. 395 (1860); Smith v. Holdoway Const. Co.,
129 S.W.2d 894 (Mo. 1939); Knickmeier v. Fleer, 185 S.W.2d 57 (Mo. Ct. App. 1945);
Simpson v. Del Hoyo, 94 N.Y. 189 (1883); North W. Mortgage Investors Corp. v.
Slumkoski, 478 P.2d 748 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970).
27. 190 So. 359 (La. 1939).
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land as tenants in common. Manuel Bell owned an undivided
one-fourth interest, and Pleasant Bell owned the remaining
three-fourths interest. When the property taxes were due each
year, the Bells contributed their respective shares, and one of
them would go to the sheriff's office to pay the taxes. When
Pleasant Bell mortgaged his three-fourths interest to Joseph
Staring, Staring took responsibility for paying Pleasant Bell's
share of the taxes in order to protect the mortgage lien. The first
year that Staring took over Pleasant Bell's tax payment, Manuel
Bell went to the sheriff's office to pay his one-fourth share of the
taxes. The sheriff refused to accept his partial payment. There-
fore, Manuel Bell and Staring agreed that Bell would give Star-
ing one-fourth of the taxes each year and that Staring would
deliver the tax payment to the sheriff.
Two years after this agreement, Staring deliberately failed
to pay the taxes, though he accepted Manuel Bell's payment,
and bought the property at the resulting tax sale. Manuel Bell
was given no direct notice of the sale and remained unaware of
it. For the next fifteen years, he continued paying his share of
the taxes to Staring and then, after Staring's death, to his son
who inherited the property. Staring's son gave a mortgage on
the property, which was assigned to Canal Bank. When the loan
went into default, Canal Bank began a foreclosure action.
Manuel Bell defended against the action by arguing that the
mortgage was fraudulently given with respect to his one-fourth
interest because Staring's son knew that he owned only a three-
fourths interest. Even though the Starings had committed a
"terrible fraud and injustice" " upon "apparently uninformed
people [who] trusted the Starings and placed implicit faith in
their honesty and integrity,"29 and even though the Bells had
lived on the land for sixty-five years, 0 the court held that Canal
Bank was not subject to the fraud defense. The court reasoned
that the Bells could have protected themselves from the
Starings' wrongdoing by checking the property records or by
demanding to see the paid tax receipts. Because they failed to do
28. Id. at 364.
29. Id.
30. Pursuant to Louisiana's public records doctrine, possession does not provide
constructive notice. See Manion v. Pollingue, 524 So. 2d 25, 34 (La. Ct. App. 1988); Max
Nathan, Jr. & Anthony P. Dunbar, The Collateral Mortgage: Logic and Experience, 49
LA. L. REV. 39, 44 n.22 & 45 n.23 (1988).
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so, they could not assert a defense against the innocent mort-
gage assignee that had relied on the public property records.
"[I]t was due to [the Bells'] fault that this deplorable and unfor-
tunate situation was made possible and as between these vic-
tims and the bona fide parties who dealt with the property on
the faith of the public records, they must bear the loss."3'
The court in Bell imposed a high standard of care on the
property owner. Though the Bells were unaware of any change
in the property title and were undisturbed in their possession,
the court said that they were at fault for failing to either check
the property records or demand production of the tax receipts.
Not surprisingly, then, courts do not permit a fraud defense in
the more usual case in which the defrauded owner knowingly
executed and delivered a deed or mortgage. For example, in
Bloomer v. Henderson,32 a landowner was the subject of a "gross
fraud"33 that caused him to convey his property to a person who
subsequently gave a mortgage. The mortgage was assigned to an
innocent assignee. The court held that the mortgage could not be
invalidated on the basis of fraud for the same two reasons given
in Bell: (1) as between an innocent assignee and a landowner
who acted carelessly, the assignee should be protected; and (2) a
person who relies in good faith on the property records should be
protected. This outcome is consistent with the decisions in every
jurisdiction except New York.
2. Resulting trust
Courts have been as unyielding to claims by beneficiaries of
resulting trusts as they have been to victims of fraud. As in the
fraud cases, courts have protected a person who purchased land
or a mortgage from a trustee when the purchaser did not have
notice of the beneficiary's interest.34 Also like the fraud cases,
31. Bell, 190 So. at 364.
32. 8 Mich. 395 (1860).
33. Id. at 405.
34. See, e.g., Gregory v. Savage, 32 Conn. 250, 262 (1864); American Metro.
Mortgage, Inc. v. Maricone, 423 So.2d 396 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Woodbury v.
Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 166 S.W.2d 552 (Mo. 1942); George F. Perry & Sons v.
Mand, 158 A. 378 (N.J. 1932); International State Bank v. Bray, 533 P.2d 583 (N.M.
1975); Haynesworth v. Bischoff, 6 S.C. 159 (1874); Van Burkleo v. Southwestern Mfg.
Co., 39 S.W. 1085 (Tex. App. 1896); North W. Mortgage Investors Corp. v. Slumkoski,
478 P.2d 748 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970).
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courts often express an overriding concern with protecting the
land recording system and those who rely on it.
Courts have been equally resistant to claims by very sympa-
thetic beneficiaries as to claims by victims of fraud. North West-
ern Mortgage Investors v. Slumkoski35 presents facts as compel-
ling as those in Bell, and, as in Bell, the court upheld the mort-
gage assignee's right to foreclose. In Slumkoski, Bessie
Slumkoski held title to her parents' home in a resulting trust for
them. Her parents were sixty-nine and sixty-seven years old,
had fourth-grade educations, were unfamiliar with legal mat-
ters, and were in poor health. When they wanted to purchase
the home, they did not have $500 for the down payment. There-
fore, Slumkoski gave them $500 as a gift and took title in her
name. Her parents paid the balance of the purchase price over
time and lived continuously in the home. Slumkoski never lived
there.
Slumkoski subsequently was induced to buy a laundromat
by fraudulent representations and concealment. During the sale
negotiations, the seller asked Slumkoski if she owned any prop-
erty. When she replied that she did not, the seller asked if she
had any property in her name. She told him about her parents'
home. At the hearing, Slumkoski testified that at the closing,
the seller had her sign several papers. When she asked him
what the papers were, he said: "This is just a formality, just a
business agreement."36 One of the papers was a mortgage on her
parents' home, which the seller sold to the foreclosing assignee.
Slumkoski testified that she had known that she was signing a
promissory note but that she had not known that she was sign-
ing a mortgage. Her mother testified that she had not autho-
rized Slumkoski to mortgage the home and had been unaware of
the transaction. She did not tell her husband about being served
with a complaint in the foreclosure action "because he was suf-
fering from heart disease."37
In deciding whether to prevent the foreclosure, the court
assumed the strongest facts in favor of the property owners. It
assumed that Slumkoski held title to the home as a resulting
trustee, that her parents had not authorized her to use their
35. 478 P.2d 748 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970).
36. Id. at 750.
37. Id.
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home as collateral for a loan, and that she had been fraudu-
lently induced to purchase the laundromat. Despite these facts,
the court held that the mortgage assignee could foreclose. Un-
like Bell, however, the court's decision on these facts was incor-
rect. The court's opinion demonstrates the danger created by a
court's application of the law governing negotiable instruments
when dealing with mortgages and land titles.
Because the promissory note signed by Slumkoski was a
negotiable instrument, the court stated that the mortgage
should share the note's immunity to defenses. The court then
quoted from the statutory definition of a "holder in due course";
to be an HDC, the mortgage assignee "must have taken the
mortgage (armed with the immunities of negotiability) without
notice of any 'defect in the title of the person negotiating it.'" 38
State law defined "notice" as actual notice and not mere con-
structive notice.
The court's reliance on this portion of the HDC definition
was mistaken in two ways. First, the quoted language deals
with title to the note, rather than with a defense to its enforce-
ment. Entirely different provisions in the state's commercial law
deal with the availability of defenses. The court seriously com-
pounded this error by then applying the provision to determine
title to the land. The court reasoned that even though state law
treats possession of land as providing constructive notice to
mortgagees, that law did not apply. Instead, the court held that
the mortgage assignee was an HDC and could foreclose because
it did not have actual notice of the parents' possession.
The court's reasoning is fundamentally flawed. The exten-
sion of the note's immunity from defenses to the mortgage only
prevents a landowner from challenging a foreclosure action on
the basis that the note is unenforceable because of failure of
consideration or some other personal defense. The law concern-
ing negotiable instruments does not apply when determining
ownership of mortgaged land. Land titles are determined by the
land laws. Unlike Bell, which arose in a state where possession
does not provide constructive notice, 9 Slumkoski arose in a ju-
risdiction in which possession does provide notice, including to a
38. Id. at 751 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 62.01.052 (1970)).
39. See Bell v. Canal Bank & Trust Co., 190 So. 359, 364 (La. 1939).
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mortgagee.4" On that basis, the court should have prevented the
foreclosure. Because the court instead focused on the negotiable
instruments law, it reached an incorrect result with devastating
consequences for the home owners.
Fortunately, other courts considering resulting trusts have
reached the correct result by relying on the land laws. Courts
routinely hold that a mortgage holder with actual or construc-
tive notice of a resulting trust is bound by it. If the mortgage
holder did not have notice of the resulting trust when it acquired
the mortgage, it owns it free of the beneficiary's interest. The
result is the same whether the trust property is a mortgage41 or
the mortgaged land.42
3. Wrongful release by the original mortgagee
When a mortgagee executes a release of a mortgage after
having assigned it to someone else, courts normally hold that
the release is effective when a purchaser of the land or a subse-
quent mortgagee did not have notice of the assignment.' In
reaching this result, courts express an overriding concern for the
recording system. For example, in Jenks v. Shaw, 44 the court
held that a purchaser of land who relied on an apparently valid
release from the original mortgagee acquired title free of the
mortgage. The court firmly grounded its holding on the necessity
for protecting the recording act's integrity.
40. See Slumkoski, 478 P.2d at 751.
41. See, e.g., Gregory v. Savage, 32 Conn. 250 (1864); George F. Perry & Sons v.
Mand, 158 A. 378 (N.J. 1932).
42. See, e.g., American Metro. Mortgage, Inc. v. Maricone, 423 So. 2d 396 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1982); International State Bank v. Springer Prod. Credit Ass'n, 533 P.2d
583 (N.M. 1975); Haynesworth v. Bischoff, 6 S.C, 159 (1874); Van Burkleo v.
Southwestern Mfg. Co., 39 S.W. 1085 (Tex. App. 1896); Slumkoski, 478 P.2d at 748.
43. See, e.g., Ameribank Sav. Banks v. Resolution Trust Corp., 858 F. Supp. 576
(E.D. Va. 1994); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Guy, 135 So. 434 (Ala. 1931); Federal
Land Bank v. Corinth Bank & Trust Co., 107 So. 88 (Ala. 1926); Kansas City Mortgage
Co. v. Crowell, 239 So. 2d 130 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Brenner v. Neu, 170 N.E.2d
897 (Ill. App. Ct. 1960); Jenks v. Shaw, 68 N.W. 900 (Iowa 1896); Bacon v. Van
Schoonhoven, 87 N.Y. 446 (1882); Trustees of Union College v. Wheeler, 16 Sickels 12
(N.Y. 1874); Henniges v. Johnson, 84 N.W. 350 (N.D. 1900); Kalen v. Gelderman, 278
N.W. 165 (S.D. 1938); Fannin Inv. & Dev. Co. v. Neuhaus, 427 S.W.2d 82 (Tex. App.
1968); Beckman v. Ward, 24 P.2d 1091 (Wash. 1933); Marling v. Milwaukee Realty Co.,
106 N.W. 844 (Wis. 1906).
44. 68 N.W. 900 (Iowa 1896).
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The policy of our registry laws is that the records shall disclose
the true condition of lands as to title and incumbrances. These
laws are for the protection of all concerned in lands, and they
should and do apply to transfers of mortgages as well as to the
mortgages themselves. It is no greater hardship to require the
assignee of a mortgage to record the assignment than to re-
quire the mortgagee to record his mortgage. The record in both
cases is equally demanded for the protection of persons having
dealings with the land.45
One court in particular has repudiated strongly the applica-
bility of the UCC in cases involving land titles. In Federal Land
Bank v. Corinth Bank & Trust Co.,4  an owner of mortgaged
land borrowed money to pay off an existing loan and gave a
mortgage to secure the new loan. The owner and lender had no
notice that the mortgage had been assigned because the assign-
ment was unrecorded. The owner paid the original mortgagee,
and the mortgagee executed a release. In a subsequent action to
foreclose the mortgage, the assignee argued that because it was
an HDC, it was not subject to the personal defense of payment.
In holding that the mortgage release was effective, the court
clearly and correctly rejected application of the law of negotiable
instruments in determining title to land:
[Als a matter of notice to subsequent purchasers, it is immate-
rial whether the record shows that the note secured is negotia-
ble or nonnegotiable. Very clearly, the question does not in-
volve the rights of a holder in due course of negotiable
paper..., but only the effect of the paper as visible notice to a
subsequent purchaser that it may have been transferred.47
At least two jurisdictions have created an exception to the
general rule that a release from the original mortgagee is effec-
tive if the mortgage assignment is unrecorded. In Kalen v.
Gelderman,4 the South Dakota Supreme Court held that a
mortgagee that personally supervised the payoff of a senior
mortgage was not protected from an unrecorded assignment of
it. Similarly, in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Guy,49 the
45. Id at 904.
46. 107 So. 88 (Ala. 1926).
47. Id. at 91 (citation omitted).
48. 278 N.W. 165 (S.D. 1938).
49. 135 So. 434 (Ala. 1931).
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Alabama Supreme Court held that a purchaser of encumbered
land that required that the mortgage be discharged as a precon-
dition to purchasing was not protected from an unrecorded as-
signment. In both cases, the court reasoned that a person re-
sponsible for a loan payoff has a duty to insist on production of
the note and mortgage. By failing to do so, the balancing of the
equities shifted in favor of the relatively less blameless assignee.
In contrast, a subsequent purchaser of the land or mortgage
would be protected by the wrongfully executed release. A person
who was not a party to the loan payoff cannot be expected to
demand to see notes secured by a mortgage that appears from
the property records to have been released.
An alternative rationale for these cases that is more consis-
tent with recording act reasoning is that a subsequent purchaser
has constructive notice not only of recorded documents, but also
of any matters that would be revealed by a reasonable inquiry.
Demanding production of a note and mortgage as a condition of
a loan payoff reasonably could be construed as being within the
scope of inquiry notice. As with the balancing of equities ap-
proach employed by the courts in Kalen and in Guy, the duty of
inquiry would not require a subsequent purchaser to demand to
see a note and mortgage that previously had been discharged.
The benefit of this recording act rationale over the balancing of
equities approach is that it more directly addresses the notice
aspect of third-party defense cases rather than creating a spuri-
ous exception.
Of course, neither the recording act rationale nor the balanc-
ing of the equities rationale applies if the state recording act
does not include mortgage assignments. In those few states in
which assignments are not included, the absence of an assign-
ment from the public records does not protect a subsequent pur-
chaser or mortgagee that relies on an apparently valid recorded
release.5 ° Instead, a recorded mortgage that has not previously
been satisfied of record gives notice that the mortgage is an
outstanding lien that can be released only by its actual owner
and not by its record owner. Similarly, even in those states in
which mortgage assignments are included in the recording act, a
50. See, e.g., Borgess Inv. Co. v. Vette, 44 S.W. 754 (Mo. 1898). The Borgess
decision does not state that the applicable recording act did not apply to mortgage
assignments. However, the following cases establish that fact: Hellweg v. Bush, 74
S.W.2d 89, 93 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934); De Laureal v. Kemper, 9 Mo. App. 77 (1880).
10031 THIRD PARTY DEFENSES TO MORTGAGES 1023
wrongful release will be effective only if it complies with the
statutory requirements for a release.-"
4. Wrongful release by a mortgagee that acquired fee title
The cases in this category arise when a mortgagee acquires
fee title to the mortgaged land after assigning the mortgage and
then purports to convey the fee title free of the lien. Although
this category is similar to the previous one, it differs in two sig-
nificant respects. First, when an apparent mortgagee acquires
fee title, the doctrine of merger becomes relevant. Pursuant to
the doctrine of merger, when one person holds two interests in
property in the same right and without an intervening interest,
the two interests will coalesce into one unless the holder intends
to keep them distinct. Thus, when a mortgagee acquires fee title
to the mortgaged land, the mortgage can merge into the fee and
be extinguished.52 Second, the prior category of cases normally
involves a written mortgage release. Because the cases in cate-
gory four rely on merger, no written release is given and re-
corded. The following analysis of the cases in this category will
demonstrate the importance of these two factors.
The cases demonstrating this fourth fact pattern have been
described as "divided."53 On their face, they do appear to be in
conflict. The conflict stems in large part from a difference in the
courts' analysis of the merger issue. In the majority of cases, the
courts hold that when the property records indicate that the
original mortgagee owns the fee title and the mortgage, merger
"presumptively" applies, and the mortgage is extinguished.
Many cases buttress this conclusion with the fact that, in re-
sponse to an inquiry by the bona fide purchaser, the mort-
gagee/owner represented that the mortgage was no longer a
lien. 4 Some courts also analogize this type of case to the previ-
ous category of cases.55 They reason that because a mortgage
51. See, e.g., Merchants' Trust Co. v. Davis, 290 P. 383, 386 (Idaho 1930); Curtis
v. Moore, 46 N.E. 168 (N.Y. 1897); Thauer v. Smith, 250 N.W. 842, 844 (Wis. 1933).
52. See Ann M. Burkhart, Freeing Mortgages of Merger, 40 VAND. L. REV. 283,
284-85 (1987).
53. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, at 384 & n.17.
54. See, e.g., Gregory v. Savage, 32 Conn. 250 (1864); Artz v. Yeager, 66 N.E. 917
(Ind. Ct. App. 1903); Ames v. Miller, 91 N.W. 250 (Neb. 1902); Landis v. Robacker, 169
A. 891 (Pa. 1933).
55. See, e.g., Ames, 91 N.W. at 252.
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release from a mortgagee that does not have fee title is effective,
the result should not be different when the mortgagee owns the
fee.
In contrast, courts holding that the mortgage is not extin-
guished take a contrary view of the issue of merger and of the
land purchaser's duty of inquiry. These courts generally take a
narrower approach to the issue of merger. They hold that be-
cause the original mortgagee did not in fact own the mortgage
and the fee title at the same time, merger could not apply and,
therefore, the mortgage was not extinguished.56 Although their
view of merger is crabbed, their conception of the buyer's duty of
inquiry is quite expansive. These courts state that because the
mortgage is uncancelled of record, the prospective land pur-
chaser is on notice that the mortgage is a lien in the hands of
anyone to whom it has been transferred and must make an ap-
propriate inquiry concerning its ownership.57
The focus on merger and on the related issue of the duty of
inquiry has led courts following both the majority and minority
positions seriously astray. As stated in the Restatement of Mort-
gages, the doctrine of merger should not apply to mortgages.5
This conclusion is supported by a wide variety of consider-
ations.59 Of perhaps most importance in the context of wrongful
releases is that merger is inconsistent with a system of recorded
documents, because merger is primarily a matter of intent. Gen-
erally, the interests will merge only if the owner so intends. As
stated by the Wisconsin Supreme Court:
The recording act was not passed for the purpose of enabling a
prospective purchaser to judge for himself whether there has
been a merger of two outstanding estates.... Whether there is
a merger or not oftentimes depends upon considerations extra-
neous [to] the record.... To permit the prospective purchaser
to conclusively decide for himself whether a merger of the two
interests resulted from the execution and delivery of a deed
from the original mortgagor to the apparent record holder of
56. See, e.g., Curtis v. Moore, 46 N.E. 168, 170 (N.Y. 1897); Thauer v. Smith, 250
N.W. 842, 844 (Wis. 1933).
57. See, e.g., Curtis, 46 N.E. at 168; Purdy v. Huntington, 42 N.Y. 334 (1870).
58. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY MORTGAGES § 8.5 (1997).
59. See Burkhart, supra note 52, at 329-68.
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the mortgage is going farther than was intended by the record-
ing act.60
Rather than rely on a mortgage owner's off-record intent
concerning the lien's continued vitality, recording acts provide
on-record methods for releasing mortgages. Depending on the
state statute, a mortgagee can release a mortgage by recording a
release document or by making a notation on the recorded mort-
gage. In fact, a court normally will treat a property title as being
unmarketable unless the mortgage release appears in the public
property records.6' Therefore, in the interests of protecting the
reliability of the property records, merger should be irrelevant
in determining whether the original mortgagee's wrongful re-
lease is effective to discharge the mortgage lien.
For the same reason, the land purchaser's inquiries or lack
of inquiries concerning the status of the mortgage also should be
irrelevant. First, whatever facts the buyer could discover by
such an inquiry still will not appear on the property records. The
controlling rule of law for these cases should promote a public
record of the mortgage's status. Second, the recording act's basic
operating principle is to subordinate actual ownership to the
appearance of ownership on the records; this principle provides
the carrot (or stick) for a person acquiring an interest in land to
make it a matter of public record. Third, the duty of inquiry has
never been extended to require a prospective purchaser to ask
an apparent owner whether it really owns that interest; instead,
the duty applies only to nonrecord matters, such as the rights of
a person in possession whose interest does not appear on the
public property records. Finally, if the original mortgagee is
willing to give a deed that purports to convey fee title free of the
mortgage, the mortgagee seems unlikely to admit the fraud in
response to the buyer's inquiry. If the mortgagee asserts that it
has destroyed the note and mortgage, the buyer would not know
60. Thauer, 250 N.W. at 844 (citations omitted). In Thauer, a mortgagee assigned
its mortgage to a third party and subsequently acquired fee title to the mortgaged land.
Because the assignment was unrecorded, the original mortgagee appeared to own the
fee title and the mortgage. A subsequent mortgagee argued that the prior mortgage
merged into the fee and was extinguished.
61. Unless a purchase agreement for land expressly provides otherwise, a
purchaser is entitled to receive marketable title, which is a title that is free of question.
See 4 AMERImCAN LAW OF PROPERTY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN THE UNITED
STATES § 18.7, at 670 (A. Casner ed., 1952).
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of whom to inquire further because the assignee's identity can-
not be discovered from the property records. For these reasons,
the buyer's inquiries or lack of inquiry should be irrelevant in
determining whether the mortgage is extinguished.
The majority of courts' analogies to the cases in the third
category also is misplaced. As stated above, some courts holding
that the mortgage lien is extinguished reason that because a
mortgage release from an apparent mortgagee that does not
have fee title is valid, the mortgage also should be released
when the apparent mortgagee does own fee title. However, a
crucial distinction exists between these two cases. In the former,
the apparent mortgagee has given a written release or otherwise
released the mortgage of record; in the latter, it has not. With
the completeness of the public property records being of primary
concern, the existence of a record release is a critical consider-
ation.
This consideration apparently was determinative in many of
the cases adopting the minority position that the apparent mort-
gagee's deed did not extinguish the mortgage. For example, in
Purdy v. Huntington,62 the court held that a buyer acquired fee
title subject to a mortgage that appeared from the property re-
cords to be owned by the seller of the fee title because:
[The buyer] is to be charged with constructive notice of the
existence of the mortgage, and of the continuance of its lien, by
its record in the proper office. By that he was informed not
only of the date of the mortgage, the amount secured thereby,
and of all its particulars, but that it was open and uncanceled
of record, and therefore apparently an outstanding lien and
incumbrance on the premises of which he was taking title.63
However, this type of statement is deceptive. An examina-
tion of the recording statute in effect at the time of this case
reveals that the court was not basing its holding on a general
concern for the accuracy of the property records. Its holding
instead reflects the limited scope of the recording statute with
respect to mortgage assignments. Recording was necessary to
protect a mortgage assignee only from subsequent assignees and
not from purchasers of the fee title.64 This difference in statutory
62. 42 N.Y. 334 (1870).
63. Id. at 338.
64. See id. at 338-39.
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coverage from the recording acts in the majority states, which
cover purchases of both the fee title and the mortgage, explains
the apparent division between the courts adopting the majority
position and those adopting the minority position. The division
is caused by a difference in the scope of the respective state re-
cording statutes, rather than by a theoretical or philosophical
difference in the application of similar laws.
But if the doctrine of merger, the purchaser's inquiries con-
cerning the status of the mortgage, and analogies to the third
category of cases are irrelevant in deciding these cases, how
should they be decided? As is true for the other categories of
cases, notice is the determinative factor. If the property pur-
chaser does not have actual or constructive notice of the assign-
ment, the recording act will treat the mortgagee, rather than the
assignee, as the owner of the mortgage. As the owner of the
mortgage and of the fee title, the mortgagee's deed, whether a
warranty deed or a quitclaim deed, will convey both interests to
the purchaser. In this way, the purchaser is protected from a
foreclosure. Although a future purchaser of the land might de-
mand that a mortgage release be recorded to ensure marketable
title, the deed is as effective as a mortgage release to protect the
innocent purchaser's title from the mortgage.
Of course, the purchaser will not be protected if the relevant
recording act does not apply to mortgage assignments. However,
this lack of protection is not unique to the case of a wrongful
release and is not attributable to a flaw in the theory that notice
is the key to deciding these cases. Instead, the absence of protec-
tion stems from a legislative determination that mortgage as-
signees need not record their assignment to be protected from
future purchasers of the fee title.
5. Mortgage as a fraud on creditors
These cases are the mirror image of the fraud cases in the
first category. While the first category involved situations in
which a landowner or mortgagee was fraudulently induced to
convey the land or mortgage, respectively, the cases in this cate-
gory involve a landowner and mortgagee defrauding the owner's
creditors by creating a mortgage for inadequate or no consider-
ation. A typical case involves an owner attempting to protect its
property from execution by creditors by granting a large mort-
1028 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1998
gage to the confederate mortgagee. In this way, the owner ap-
pears to have little remaining equity in the property.
When the mortgage is assigned to an assignee that is un-
aware of the fraud on creditors, courts uniformly hold that the
assignee takes free of the defense.65 For example, in McMurtry v.
Bowers,66 Annie Bowers owed money to a variety of creditors,
one of whom obtained a judgment lien against her. A few
months before the judgment creditor obtained the lien, Bowers
gave a mortgage on land she owned to satisfy a debt for which
she was not personally liable. The court held that the mortgage
constituted a fraud on her creditors because she had no legal
obligation to give it and because she received no consideration
for the transfer. Because the mortgage was assigned to a bona
fide purchaser without notice of the fraud, however, the junior
judgment lienor could not prevent it from being foreclosed on the
basis of fraud. The same result has been reached when a mort-
gage was challenged by a bankruptcy trustee.
The rationale for protecting the innocent mortgage holder is
the same as in the first category of fraud cases. To preserve the
reliability of the property records, a mortgage assignee must be
protected from claims about which it did not have actual or con-
structive notice. Although, by voluntarily executing a deed, the
defrauded owner in the first category of cases is somewhat more
culpable than the creditors alleging a fraudulent mortgage in
this sixth category, the courts have reached the correct result in
these cases as well. The greater good is served by protecting
those who rely on the property records and do not have any
other notice of conflicting claims.
6. Mortgage assigned twice
This category of cases differs from the others in a crucial
respect. In the other categories of cases, a third party to the loan
transaction was defending the mortgaged land from a foreclo-
65. See, e.g., McMurtry v. Bowers, 109 A. 361 (N.J. 1920); Danbury v. Robinson,
14 N.J. Eq. 213 (1862); First Nat'l Bank v. Brotherton, 84 N.E. 794 (Ohio 1908).
66. 109 A. 361 (N.J. 1920).
67. See First Nat'l Bank v. Brotherton, 84 N.E. 794 (Ohio 1908). The Bankruptcy
Code has codified this result. Section 550(b)(1) of the Code provides that the bankruptcy
trustee may not recover a mortgage that constitutes a fraudulent transfer if it has been
conveyed to "a transferee that takes for value,... in good faith, and without knowledge
of the voidability of the transfer avoided." 11 U.S.C. § 550(b)(1) (1994).
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sure. Even when the court held that the mortgage holder could
not enforce the mortgage, the holder still could enforce the
note.68 In contrast, this category of cases involves the right to
enforce the note, as well as the mortgage. Both assignees are
claiming title to the note and to the mortgage and the right to
enforce them.
Despite this factual difference, if the note is nonnegotiable or
if it is held by a non-HDC, the analysis is the same as for the
other categories. As in the other categories, if the relevant re-
cording act does not include mortgage assignments, the first
assignee owns the note and mortgage.69 On the other hand, if
the recording act does include mortgage assignments, an as-
signee without actual or constructive notice of a prior assign-
ment will be protected from it.70 The decision in the latter type of
case rests on the terms of the recording act alone. However,
some courts state as an additional reason for the holding that,
as between two innocent assignees, the prior assignee is more
culpable because its failure to record the assignment enabled
the assignor's wrongful re-assignment of the note and mort-
gage.7
1
The court's reliance on the recording act to decide these
cases is a straightforward application of the usual rule that a
person acquiring an interest in land takes subject to all matters
appearing in the public records. The duty to check the records is
not excused because the assignee also is acquiring a note. How-
ever, this duty, which is so central in land conveyancing, is abro-
gated when the note is a negotiable instrument. Because title to
a negotiable instrument is at issue, Article 3 of the UCC applies.
Article 3 expressly rejects the notice provided by the public re-
cords: "Public filing or recording of a document does not of itself
68. But see NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, at 385.
69. See, e.g., Neal v. Bradley, 384 S.W.2d 238 (Ark. 1964).
70. See, e.g., Guaranty Mortgage & Ins. Co. v. Harris, 193 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1966);
Blunt v. Norris, 123 Mass. 55 (1877); Brooke v. Struthers, 68 N.W. 272 (Mich. 1896)
(dictum); Owen v. Evans, 31 N.E. 999 (N.Y. 1892); Fannin Inv. and Dev. Co. v.
Neuhaus, 427 S.W.2d 82 (Te. App. 1968); In re Vermont Fiberglass, Inc., 44 B.R. 505
(Bankr. Vt. 1984); cf Syracuse Say. Bank v. Merrick, 75 N.E. 232 (N.Y. 1905) (holding
that assignor's failure to deliver bond to second assignee constituted constructive notice
of a prior unrecorded assignment).
Under some state recording acts, the subsequent assignee must record its
assignment before the prior assignee records to be protected from the prior assignment.
71. See, e.g., Harris, 193 So. 2d at 3 (The prior assignee's failure to record "made
the subsequent machinations of the assignor possible.").
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constitute notice of a defense, claim in recoupment, or claim to
the instrument." 2
This statute could be interpreted to preserve the relevance of
the land records, rather than to reject them. It could be inter-
preted to mean that, if a prospective assignee is unaware that
the note is secured by a mortgage, a recorded mortgage "does not
of itself" provide constructive notice of its existence. Similarly, if
the assignor previously had assigned the same note and mort-
gage, a recorded mortgage assignment would not constitute
notice of the prior assignment if the subsequent assignee is un-
aware of the mortgage's existence. Conversely, if a prospective
assignee knows about the mortgage, the assignee must conduct
a reasonable investigation of title to the mortgage by checking
the property records.73 If the assignee fails to do so, it will be
deemed to have constructive notice of a previously recorded
assignment.
Despite the availability of an interpretation that would at
least partially harmonize the Article 3 provision with the record-
ing acts, at least one court has rejected any role for the land
records in resolving conflicting claims to a mortgage. In Foster v.
Augustanna College & Theological Seminary, 4 a mortgagee
assigned the same note and mortgage twice. Even though the
first assignee recorded its assignment before the assignor gave
the second assignment, the court held in favor of the second
assignee. The court held that, because the second assignee had
not examined the property records and did not have any other
actual notice of the assignment, it was not subject to the first
assignee's claim. The court reasoned that, because the note im-
parts its negotiable character to the mortgage, the purchaser of
the mortgage was not subject to the recording act:
72. U.C.C. § 3-302(b) (1990).
73. A similar interpretation of the statute has been adopted when determining
ownership of a note that was purchased after its maturity:
[T]he mere fact of maturity is sufficient to place the indorsee [sic] after
maturity on notice that the instrument may be subject to some defences [sic]
or defects, and it is incumbent upon him, in exercising good faith, to make sure
that the instrument in the hands of the person from whom he takes it is not
subject to claims of ownership. Thus, the purchaser after maturity is forced to
trace his title to the instrument.
Morrison, supra note 13, at 297-98.
74. 218 P. 335 (Okla. 1923).
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It may be observed that the doctrine of constructive notice is
applicable only to a person who is dealing with the land itself,
and since the purchaser of a negotiable promissory note, se-
cured by a mortgage, is not dealing in land, there is no field for
the operation of the registry laws in cases of this kind. An
examination of the authorities discloses to our satisfaction that
the doctrine of constructive notice has never been applied to
commercial paper; the true test as to negotiable paper being
that of good or bad faith. 5
The Foster case was governed by the Negotiable Instruments
Law, which was Article 3's predecessor. However, courts have
interpreted Article 3's provision concerning the public records in
the same way. Courts applying Article 3 routinely hold that the
HDC of a negotiable instrument cuts off conflicting recorded
interests. Although no reported case involves conflicting claims
to a mortgage, courts have applied Article 3 to cut off perfected
security interests in personal property76 and a recorded state tax
lien.77 Moreover, courts regularly hold that an assignee can at-
tain HDC status even if it fails to conduct a reasonably prudent
inquiry concerning title to the note and its security.78
On its face, this result is completely contrary to the funda-
mental principle that a purchaser acquires title to a property
interest subject to all matters of which it has actual or construc-
tive notice. But Article 3 has not rejected the controlling impor-
tance of notice. Rather, it has chosen an alternative source of
notice that is more efficient for the negotiable instruments
market-possession of the note. The purchaser of a note quali-
fies as an HDC only by taking possession of the note.7 s If the
assignor cannot deliver the note, the prospective assignee can-
75. Id. at 338.
76. See, e.g., Benedictine College, Inc. v. Century Office Prods., Inc., 853 F. Supp.
1315 (D. Kan. 1994); Dallas Bank & Trust Co. v. Frigiking, Inc., 692 S.W.2d 163 (Tex.
App. 1985).
77. See Soloff v. Dollahite, 779 S.W.2d 57 (Tenn. App. 1989).
78. See New Jersey Mortgage and Inv. Corp. v. Calvetti, 171 A.2d 321, 325 (N.J.
Sup. 1961) ("As the rule is generally stated, evidence of bad faith on the part of the
holder, and not merely proof of circumstances calculated to arouse suspicion, must be
shown in order to defeat his recovery on the instrument."); Frigiking, Inc., 692 S.W.2d
at 166 ("It is not sufficient that Dallas Bank had knowledge that would put a
reasonable person on inquiry which would lead to discovery. There must be actual
knowledge of facts and circumstances which amounted to bad faith."); cf NELSON &
WnIMAN, supra note 2, at 389.
79. See U.C.C. § 3-201 (1990). See CRANDALL ET AL., supra note 10, § 16.2.
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not be an HDC because it has notice that the assignor may not
own the note. Conversely, if the assignor delivers possession, the
assignee is an HDC and is protected from third-party claims of
ownership. By protecting possession, Article 3 frees note pur-
chasers from the burden of checking the public records and mak-
ing other inquiries concerning title, which clearly facilitates the
market for negotiable instruments.
Because Article 3 affords this protection to the purchaser of a
negotiable instrument, title to the mortgage securing the instru-
ment must be protected as well. Otherwise, Article 3 could vest
title to the negotiable instrument in one person, and the record-
ing act would vest title to the mortgage in a different person.
This result is unacceptable because a mortgage cannot exist or
be enforced independent of the debt. Therefore, unlike the other
cases discussed in this Article, this one type of case is governed
by the UCC, rather than by the land laws. In this one case, the
mortgage's identity is completely subsumed by the note's.
B. Exceptions and Apparent Exceptions
Despite their usual concern for the recording acts, courts
sometimes use language that indicates that a mortgage assignee
takes free of all third-party defenses, even if it had notice of the
defense from the property records. For example, in Bloomer v.
Henderson," the Michigan Supreme Court had to determine
whether a mortgage assignee took the mortgage subject to a
third party's defense of fraud. The court rejected the defense,
relying on the common law of contracts: "[The assignee of a
chose in action takes it subject to all equities existing between
the parties to the instrument, but not to any latent equities
which some third person may have against the debtor, or party
bound by the instrument.""1 Similarly, in Anchor Loan Co. v.
Willett, 2 which involved an HDC of a negotiable instrument, the
court stated:
This Court reaches the conclusion that Anchor Loan was a
holder in due course of the negotiable promissory note and as
such is entitled to all the rights of a holder in due course and
that said chattel mortgage was incident to the promissory note
80. 8 Mich. 395 (1860).
81. Id. at 402.
82. 137 N.E.2d 532 (Ohio 1956).
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and would be subject to no equities that the original note was
not subject to. In this instant case the Court finds no fact
which would have been a defense in a suit upon the promis-
sory note.8
In each of these cases, the court based its holding on the
difficulty of discovering third-party defenses. However, the
quoted language goes beyond this expressed concern by stating
that the assignee takes free of all third-party defenses and not
just those of which it had no notice. Moreover, the quoted lan-
guage states a broader rule than was necessary to decide the
case before the court. In each case, the assignee did not have
actual or constructive notice of the defense. Therefore, to the
extent that the courts' statements indicate that all third-party
defenses are barred even if the assignee had notice, they should
be treated as thoughtlessly created dictum.
Because land law is left to the almost exclusive province of
the states, at least one state usually marches to a different
drummer. With respect to third-party defenses, New York's law
is the exception to the otherwise virtually universal rule. New
York's law is the complete opposite of the statements of law in
the two prior cases, and it is equally erroneous. Rather than
holding that mortgage assignees take free of all third-party de-
fenses, New York courts hold that assignees take subject to all
such defenses, even in the absence of notice. For example, in In
re Levine,84 the court held that a mortgage assignee was subject
to a third party's defense even though the assignee had no ac-
tual or constructive notice of it: "[N]ot only is an assignee subject
to the equities or defenses in favor of the mortgagor, he is also
subject to any latent equities that may exist in favor of unknown
third parties." 5 This legal conclusion is based on the determina-
tion that a mortgage assignee can acquire no greater rights than
the original mortgagee; because the mortgagee was subject to
the defense in that case, so is the assignee. The New York rule is
well-entrenched, but perhaps the courts eventually will yield to
the realities of the modern secondary mortgage market and
83. I& at 535.
84. 23 B.R. 410 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
85. Id. at 413.
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protect mortgage assignees from defenses of which they had no
notice and no reasonable means of discovery. 6
V. CONCLUSION
In cases involving a third party's defense to a mortgage,
notice is the key criterion. If the mortgage holder had actual or
constructive notice of the defense when it acquired the mort-
gage, it took subject to the defense. Conversely, if the holder did
not have notice, it took the mortgage free of the defense. When
title to a secured negotiable instrument is at issue, notice is
defined by Article 3 of the UCC In every other case, notice is
defined by the land laws and, in particular, by the jurisdiction's
recording act. In those cases, distinctions between negotiable
and nonnegotiable instruments, HDCs and non-HDCs, real and
personal defenses, and patent and latent equities are irrelevant.
These commercial law distinctions are relevant only when deter-
mining defenses to enforcement of the secured debt. When a
court enters this commercial law labyrinth to decide issues con-
cerning title to land or to a mortgage, the court-and land ti-
tles-are lost.
86. A handful of cases in other jurisdictions have followed the New York
approach, but all have been repudiated or distinguished to virtual extinction.
